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STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Appellant is a Utah corporation which publishes and markets
books and tapes and conducts seminars in the field of real estate.

(Testimony

of Richard B. Weeks, Formal Hearing Transcript at 8-0).
2.

Appellant uses direct mail advertising as a marketing

technique to contact potential customers and to invite them to seminars and
conferences.

(Weeks at 9.)
3.

The appellant leases mailing lists Containing names and

addresses from various mailing list brokerage companies. The brokerage
companies do not own the lists, but rather they havfc access to the raw lists
of names through the owners' permission.
4.

(Weeks at 14.)

The brokerage companies compiled th£ lists of names and

addresses to be leased to the appellant by narrowing the raw lists according
to certain "selects" or characteristics such as geographic areas, gender,
income bracket, home ownership, magazines purchased, and number of children.
(Testimony of Thomas M. Tolman, Formal Hearing Transcript at 30.) The number
and the type of the "selects" chosen varied according to the appellant's needs
and desires.

(Tolman at 29 and 31.) Most brokerage companies have access to

the same raw lists (Tolman at 28.); and other companies, even those not
involved in real estate, could lease the same lists with the same selects.
(Tolman at 91.)
5. Appellant received the mailing li^ts in two forms.
Approximately forty percent (40%) (Weeks at 14.) 6f the names and addresses
were transferred via magnetic computer tapes from which the company prepared
mailing lists on its own word processing equipment.

(Weeks at 12.) The

remaining sixty percent (60%) (Weeks at 14.) of the names and addresses
appeared on typed lists which the appellant gummed and then cut up into labels
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to be attached directly to the materials mailed.

(Weeks at 12.) Each list,

whether on tape or paper, was used only once according to the agreements
between the brokerage companies and the appellant.

(Weeks at 12 and 13.)

Depending upon the instructions from the mailing list brokers, the appellant
was required to either return or destroy each computer tape after the one use.
(Weeks at 12.)
6.

Each lease of the lists constituted a single transaction where

the cost was determined by the value of the lists.

(Tolman at 53.) There was

no separate fee for the broker services (Tolman at 49, 84, 85.), although the
lists' values could reflect the brokers' greater or lesser expenditure of time
and effort.

(Tolman at 29 and 62.)
7.

The mailing lists on magnetic computer tapes were subjected to

a merge-purge function by the appellant following their receipt from the
broker companies.

The merge-purge operated to combine the lists and to

eliminate duplications in the names (Tolman at 102.)
8.

Appellant claims that the rentals of the mailing lists were

not subject to use tax because the lists are intangible and because the
transactions involved payments for services.
9.

(Weeks at 19 and 20.)

For the audit period from July 1, 1979, through June 30, 1982,

the Utah State Tax Commission assessed a use tax of $19,711.21 plus penalties
and interest.

The appellant is requesting that approximately $7,750.00 of the

use tax deficiency be abated.

All of the penalty has been abated and is not

at issue before this court. The use tax was assessed on the rentals by the
appellant of $154,844.10 worth of mailing lists.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The Supreme Court should review the district court's judgment

in this tax commission review proceeding on the same basis as other judgments.
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2.

The acquisitions of the mailing lists were purchases of

tangible personal property, not the uses of services!.
3.

The use of the mailing lists are us^s of tangible personal

property taxable under Utah use tax statutes.
4.

The legislature couched U.C.A. 59-l$-3 in broad, general terms

in order to afford the tax commission great latitude in administering the
statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE JUDGMENT
OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN THIS TAX COMMISSION
REVIEW PROCEEDING ON THE SAME BASI(S AS OTHER
JUDGMENTS
In Parson Asphalt Products, Inc. v. Sta(te Tax Commission, 617 P.2d
397 (Utah 1980) this court stated:
The review by this Court of the judgment of the
district court in these tax commission review
proceedings is on the same basis as other judgments:
they are entitled to the presumptions of verity; the
burden is upon appellant to show there was error; and
this Court will not reverse unless the findings are
without substantial support in the evidence, or there
was error in law...
Appellant argues that since the partie$ stipulated that the formal
hearing transcript and exhibits constituted a fulli record, this Court should
consider the matter de novo. Appellant relies on [Sacramento Baseball Club,
Inc. v. Great Northern Baseball Co., 748 P.2d 105$ (Utah 1987) Sacramento
Baseball holds, in pertinent part, that when a trial court relies on
stipulated facts to decide the case, "this court (joes not apply the clearly
erroneous standard, but will sustain the lower court's decision only if
convinced of its correctness...Thus we examine the facts de novo."
1060.
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Id at

The ruling in Sacramento Baseball does not apply to the case at
bar because the tax division of the district court was not functioning in the
role of a trial court.

Instead, it conducted a de novo review on the record

of a tax commission decision pursuant to U.C.A. 59-1-603.

U.C.A. 59-1-603

(repealed effective December 31, 1987) required the district court to conduct
de novo review of "appeals from and petitions for review of decisions of the
commission..."

The type of review contemplated by the statute was a "trial

upon the record made before the lower tribunal without the submission of new
testimony.

The purpose of the de novo requirement was to signify that the

scope of the court's review of the record would include a fresh consideration
of questions of fact as well as questions of law."

Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d

45 (Utah 1981).
The district court conducted a complete trial de novo on the
record, issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The stipulation of

the parties merely certified the tax commission's record upon which the
district court's review was based.
The Sacramento Baseball rule is further inapplicable because its
rationale does not pertain.

The rule is based on the premise that when a

district court relies on stipulated facts, it lacks the opportunity to observe
the witnesses and hear their testimony.

See Prince v. W. Empire Life Ins.

Co., 19 Utah 2d 174, 428 P.2d 163 (1967).
fact was the tax commission.

In the case at bar, the trier of

The commissioners who heard the case had ample

opportunity to see and hear the witnesses as well as to cross examine them.
POINT II
THE ACQUISITIONS OF THE MAILING LISTS WERE
NOT THE USES OF SERVICES
To be taxable under §59-16-3 of the Utah Code Ann., the item used
must be tangible personal property.

Except for specific services outlined in

§59-16-3(b), there is no tax on the use of services.
_ 4 -

The fact that the

mailing lists were leased for a one time use, rather than purchased, does not
affect the question of whether there were uses of services or property.

When

a lessee has the right to possession, operation, or use of tangible personal
property, then the use tax applies to the amount pai^J pursuant to the lease
agreement, regardless of the duration of the agreement.
Commission Rule A12-02-S32(b).

As the court said in Comptroller of the

Treasury 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983):
only once.

Utah State Tax

"It is said each tape is used

But a dress pattern purchased at retail and used to make only one

dress (or even if never used) is taxable." JUL at £61.
Both the computer tapes and the typed lists can be treated the
same in the determination of whether the appellant was paying for services or
for property when it rented the mailing lists. Thel use of both the computer
tapes and the typed lists is either the use of property or the use of
services.

The issue here is one of property versusi services rather than

tangible property versus intangible property.
In determining whether a transaction i$ for property or for
service, courts usually focus on the essence of th^ transaction or, in other
words, the real and true object of the transaction^

Spencer Gifts, Inc. v.

Director, Division of Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 175, 440 A.2d 104 (1981).

The

Supreme Court of Ohio, recognizing that most transactions involve a mixed
degree of personal service and of transfer of tangible personal property,
articulated the test as whether the real object sought by the buyer is the
service per se or the property produced by the service. Accountants Computer
Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 29$ N.E.2d 519 (1973).
Once the dominant or primary purpose is decided, then the
transaction is characterized as a single overall function, either the rental
or purchase of equipment or the provision of services. Comptroller of the
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Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.f 296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983).
be considered in determining the dominant purpose are as follows:

Factors to
(1.)

whether the service involved was consequential or inconsequential to the
conveyance of the tangible personal property; (2.) whether there was a
separate charge for the service in addition

to the charge for the products;

(3.) whether the purchaser or renter acquired a tangible personal property
interest; and (4.) whether the value of the product was temporary or
transitory.
The appellant contends that the objects of its transactions with
the mailing list companies were the services provided and that the rentals of
the actual mailing lists were incidental and inconsequential to those
services.

The appellant claims that the service aspect far outweighs the

value of the final products.

However, such an argument is analogous to

ordering a particular cake, relying on the baker1s help and expertise in
deciding what kind and how much, and then claiming that the baker's services
were the object of the purchase, with the cake existing only as an incidental
element.
Just as one makes a one time "use" of a cake by eating it, the
appellant made a one time use of the mailing lists by using them.

The

services would have been meaningless without the mailing lists as the final
products.

What the appellant wanted and used were the names and addresses as

they were delivered in tangible personal property form.

The fact that the

tapes and the paper cost little by themselves does not convert activities from
the acquisitions of property into the acquisitions of services.
Recent court decisions deal with this issue in a realistic and
practical manner.

Old West Realty, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 110

Id. 546, 716 P.2d 1318 (1986), involved a multiple listing service which
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distributed monthly multiple listing booklets to saljesmen who subscribed to
the service.

The Idaho Supreme Court found that thq taxpayer failed to

establish his entitlement to an exemption from the general sales taxing
authority, although the transactions were admittedly mixed ones of services
and property.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the objects of

the sales were the services rendered.

Instead, thejcourt held that the

transactions were taxable ones involving the transfers of the booklets which
were defined as tangible personal property.
Even where services are the dominant elbment in a transaction,
courts have found that the real object test may point to the final product as
the essence of the transaction.

In Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487

A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985), a toy manufacturing company hired an art company to
design and construct packaging for a new toy.

The court found that, although

there were considerable expertise and effort invested in producing the package
and that the effort exceeded the component value of the resulting tangible
personal property, the transfer of the personal property was not incidental to
the service rendered.

The Rhode Island Court, quoting Community Telecasting

Service v. Johnson, 220 A.2d 500, 503 (Me. 1966), stated:

"'The fact that

property the subject of a sale is custom made and that labor is the principal
cost factor does not establish the contract as on^ for rendition of services
rather than sale. ,n

The court held that the real object of the transaction

was the end product of the mechanical artwork froqi which to fabricate the toy
package.
In this case, the appellant sought to gain access to the mailing
lists.

The focus and goal of the transactions wefe the uses of the names and

addresses.

While it appears to be true that the brokers offered advice and

expertise based on past experience, the services provided were incidental to
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the end products.

(This is particularly true where the appellant in the

instant case applied further services to the tapes after acquiring them; the
merge-purge activities took place.)

See Citizens Financial Corp. v. Kosydar,

43 Ohio St. 2d, 331 N.E.2d 435 (1975), where the court held that the object of
the transaction was a hard-copy printout of the information.
There was no separate charge for the services in the instant case.
Appellant did not pay for the services; it paid to obtain and to use the
mailing lists.
When the appellant rented the lists from the list brokerage
companies, it acquired a tangible property interest because Mark 0. Haroldsen,
Inc. could then use the lists and apply the information for its own purposes.
See Cowdrey, Software and Sales Tax:

The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. Rev.

181 (1983) (purchaser acquires a tangible personal property interest where
primary purpose is to use a computer program from the user's own application).
It is irrelevant to the acquisition of a property interest that
the rental entitled the appellant to only a one-time use of the names and
addresses.
is used.

The use tax is imposed regardless of how many times the property
The fact of one use does not change transactions for property into

transactions for services.

Towne-Oller and Associates v. State Tax

Commission, 120 A.D.2d 873, 502 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1986).

In Towne, the plaintiff

rented computer time from Universal, a computer renting company, which, for a
designated fee, allowed plaintiff's employees to go over to the company and to
use their computers.

The court held that plaintiff's use of computer time was

taxable because it was a transfer of possession, even though Universal had the
power to cease plaintiff's use at any time.
Courts sometimes distinguish between canned and custom software
programs on the basis that custom-made programs essentially involve services
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and may therefore be nontaxable.

See First National Bank of Fort Worth v»

Bullock, 584 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Chittenden Trust Co. v. King,
143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983)-

However, this line of analysis appears

arbitrary and weak when viewed in the light of recent court decisions which
have taken a more practical view.

See the earlier discussion and particularly

Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124 (R.jl. 1985).

Whether the

taxpayer purchases a program "off the shelf" or commissions a program to be
custom-made, the real object of the transaction is the acquisition of the
program.
Even if custom-made programs are considered nontaxable, the
exemption for customization is inapplicable to the tase at bar.

The appellant

did not purchase customized lists from the list brokerage companies.

The

brokers did not create the lists of names; they merely narrowed the lists down
to specific areas chosen by the appellant such as geographic area, zip code
area, or income level. Although the lists may hav^ been altered or adapted to
the appellants specifications, they are not "customized" mailing lists.
Comptroller v. Eguitable Trust Co., 296 Md. 459, 4$4 A.2d 248, 250-54 (1983).
Customers frequently order products with certain specifications, such as a
flavor of cake, a type of flower, or a color of clothing.
preferences do not render the products "custom-mad^."
rearranged the forms of the raw lists of names.

However, these

The brokers merely

S£e Accountants Computer

Services, Inc. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 120, 298j N.E. 2d 519 (1973).
POINT III
THE USES OF THE MAILING LISTS A^E USES OF
TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXABLE UNDER
UTAH USE TAX STATUTES!
Utah Code Ann. §59-16-3 (1983 Supp.) Imposes an excise or use tax
on "[t]he storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible
- 9 -

personal property."

To be taxable under this section, there must be use of

tangible personal property.
property.

By implication, there is no tax on intangible

With the exception of specified services as outlined in Utah Code

Ann. §59-16-3(b), there is no tax on the use of services. Therefore, if the
property in a transaction is tangible personal property, then a tax is
imposed.

This is true unless the transaction was actually for a nontaxable

service, and any transfer of tangible property was incidental to that service.
The two elements are separate and independent requirements for taxation.
The fact that the mailing lists were rented or leased, rather than
purchased, does not affect the question of whether there was a use of services
or of tangible personal property.

Under Utah Code Ann. §59-16-3(c) (1983

Supp.), tangible personal property leased or rented is specifically subject to
use tax.
The Utah definition of tangible personal property is premised upon
the traditional concept of tangible property, i.e., anything that can be
possessed is an object of tangible property.

Utah State Tax Commission Rule

A12-02-S26 provides as follows:
Tangible personal property embraces all goods, wares,
merchandise, produce, and commodities, all tangible or
corporeal things and substances which are dealt in or
capable of being possessed or exchanged. It does not
include real estate or any interest therein or
improvements thereon nor does it include bank
accounts, stocks, bonds, mortgages, notes and other
evidence of debt, insurance certificates or policies,
personal or governmental licenses. The term does not
include water
in pipes, conduits, ditches or
reservoirs but does include water in bottles, tanks or
other containers. Tangible personal property includes
all other physically existing articles or things
including property severed from real estate. A sales
or use tax is imposed on the sale of tangible personal
property.
In applying the limited traditional concept of tangible property,
one must conclude that the mailing lists are tangible.
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They arrived at the

appellant's company in the form of magnetic computer tapes or typed sheets of
paper, both of which are corporeal substances capable of being perceived by
the senses and of being possessed and exchanged.
Today, courts realize that the "Doctrine of Tangibility" as
traditionally stated is a somewhat irrelevant concept developed in an earlier
time for different purposes.
Taxation, 182 N.J. Super. 179,

Spencer Gifts, Inc. v. Director, Division of
, 440 A.2d 104, 1210-21 (1981).

Consequently, courts and legislatures have endeavoHd to expand the doctrine
in order to maintain its viability and its applicability.

See Martin v.

Reynolds Metals Co., 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (where invasions of the
owner plaintiff's land by invisible particles of toxic gas was held to be a
physical trespass).

The Utah definition does not specifically state that

tangible property is only those objects that can be "perceived by the senses"
and is, therefore, arguably broader and more modern than more limited
definitions of other jurisdictions.
The Utah Supreme Court, recognizing the need to apply the legal
concept of tangibility in a practical manner, held that the sale of foreign
and rare coins was subject to state sales tax.

Tho|rne and Wilson, Inc. v.

Utah State Tax Commission, 681 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1984).

The Utah court, quoting

with approval the decision in Scotchman's Coin Shop, Inc. v. Administrative
Hearing Commission, 654 S.W.2d 873 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), stated "'it is
important to look beyond legal fictions and academic jurisprudence in order to
discover the economic realities of the case . . . • '" Thorne, 681 P.2d at
1238.
In Thorne, the court looked to the "essence of the transaction"
and found that the coins were tangible personal property because they were
"sold for their intrinsic value and their face val^ie [was] not significant."
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Id. at 1239.

In the case at bar, the magnetic tapes were sold for their

intrinsic value, the information contained in them; and the value of the tapes
themselves was insignificant.
Valuable information on computer tapes is arguably less concrete
than precious metal within coins; however, the coins had a further value to
their buyers as a future investment, the worth of which would be determined by
the worldwide market.

"'[W]here . . .they [the coins] are transferred as an

investment commodity, they become tangible personal property . . . .IM Thorne
at 1239, quoting with approval the decision in Michigan National Bank v.
Department of Treasury, 127 Mich. App. 646,

, 339 N.W.2d 515, 517 (1983).

Thus, the value of both the coins and the mailing lists lies in their abstract
intrinsic qualities which vary in worth according to the market price applied.
The essence of the transactions in Thorne was to acquire commodities.

The

essence of the transactions here is to acquire a property interest in the
mailing lists so the lists could be utilized by the appellant.
Appellant contends that the mailing lists are nontaxable because
they are the tangible embodiment of intangible information.

Appellant argues

that the tapes and cards are incidental to the transfer of information because
the information can be transferred by alternative means.

As support for its

arguments, the appellant relies on cases dealing with or analyzing the
qualities of computer software.
While it is true that the appellant desired to purchase the
information on the tapes and typed sheets, the fact does not render the
transactions nontaxable.

To hold otherwise would require separating the

intangible information from the tangible magnetic tapes and typed lists.
Inconsistent, unfair, and somewhat ridiculous consequences result
from separating the value of the tangible medium from the value of the
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information contained thereon or therein.

For example, in Fingerhut Products

Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minni 1977), the court held
that the mailing lists typed on sheets of paper were intangible and nontaxable
while the mailing lists on gummed labels were tangibfle and taxable.

Whether

the names and addresses appeared on paper or on gummed labels, the names and
addresses were what Fingerhut sought to acquire.

Yet, the court drew a

distinction between the two kinds of physical objects ~

paper and gummed

labels — on the basis that the gummed labels were Used directly on the
envelopes while the names on the paper were not "us^d" in their present form.
Taxability should not depend on separability.

Citizens & Southern

Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717
(1984).

Magnetic tapes containing mailing lists ar^ no different from books,

records, or video tapes.

Their value lies in the matter contained in them and

generally not in the medium of transfer itself.

hi[, 311 S.E.2d at 718.

The court in Comptroller of the Treasury v. Equitable Trust Co.,
296 Md. 459, 464 A.2d 248 (1983), stated that magnetic tapes are tangible
personal property whose value is enhanced due to thte programs encoded thereon;
furthermore, a computer tape containing a copy of a| program is no less
intangible because the content is a reproduction of intellectual effort just
as a book or record is no less intangible because ilt reproduces artistic
effort.

Magnetic tapes and books have intangible features, but they are

primarily tangible in nature.

(The Comptroller court said that "intangibility

should not be determined by the extent of use. After all, a book that is read
only once is and remains tangible personal property."
at 255.

Comptroller, 464 A.2d

A book is tangible even if it is not ever read.

The Comptroller

court also noted that "because a taxable transaction might have been
structured in a nontaxable form, it does not thereby become nontaxable." Jji.
at 261.)
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In Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. Norberg, 487 A.2d 124 (R.I. 1985),
the court recognized the inherent abstract nature of computer technology, but
it refused to define computer software as an intangible object.

The court

stated that although a computer program consists of invisible, inaudible,
electronic impulses, such impulses do not "simply float in space but are
conveyed to the computer by way of the software program"; and in this way, the
"software . . .

is no different from other taxable personal property such as

films, videotapes, books, cassettes, and records."

Hasbro, 487 A.2d at 128.

In each file, videotape, book, cassette, and record, the property's value lies
in its respective abilities to store and later to display or transmit its
contents.

Chittenden Trust Co. v. King, 143 Vt. 271, 465 A.2d 1100 (1983).

(The Vermont court steadfastly refuses to draw an intangible-tangible
distinction when applying the definition of tangible personal property to
computer software tapes and continually finds computer software is tangible
personal property for sales tax purposes.)
The New York legislature, recognizing the futility of trying to
separate the information from the medium to decide taxability, enacted a state
statute which provides for the direct taxation of sales of information.

In

Skaggs-Walsh, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 120 A.D.2d 786, 501 N.Y.S.2d 520
(1986), the court held that the sale of a customer list was taxable as a sale
of information.
Even without a statute providing for the direct taxation of
transfers of information, the court in Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc. v.
South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311 S.E.2d 717 (1984), refused to
accept the argument that computer programs can be separated from the magnetic
tapes and, thus, should not be subject to taxation.
taxability should not depend on separability.
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The court stated that

Unfortunately, Utah f s legislature has nc^t yet created or revised a
statute which would update the concept of taxable tangible personal property
in this state.

As a result, this court must decide whether to interpret

Utah's use tax law to encompass modern technology orr whether to continue to be
tied to an outdated and inappropriate test of tangibility as advocated by the
taxpayer.
The most recent and the better reasoned decisions and law review
articles adopt the more progressive approach.

Statutes must be flexible and

so must the hearing bodies interpreting and applying the statutes to ever
changing fact patterns.

Legislatures do not have t(ie time or the resources to

amend every law as its meaning and application cornel into question.

Many

courts have found magnetic computer tapes and the information that they carry
to qualify as tangible personal property with unrevlised statutes.

This court

should do the same.
Some earlier state court decisions reflect the struggle they
experienced in deciding whether an object was tangible based upon whether the
contents could have been transferred by an intangible medium.

Some of these

courts reasoned that since the information contained on the tapes could have
arrived via telephone or cable transmissions, then the transactions using
tapes were transfers of intangibles and were not taxable.
The problem with the "alternative intangible medium transfer"
analysis is that it ignores realities and practicalities.

Computer programs

are not usually transmitted in alternative forms b0cause of the inconvenience
and because of the prohibitive costs, although such alternative forms are
theoretically possible.
1976).

Commerce Union Bank v. Tidwell, 538 S.W.2d 405 (Tenn.

The information is transferred on magnetic tapes because that is the

most viable method.

In comparison, the information in books could, in theory,
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be transferred by the authors1 reading the books over the telephone lines to
the receivers. Taking the analogy further, actors could deliver "movies" by
traveling and performing at different places.

However, such modes of

transmission are silly and unnecessary since printing presses and films are
available.

It is just as ridiculous to allege that since the mailing list

companies could have read or sent the names and addresses to the taxpayer over
the telephone (instead of using the magnetic tapes and typed sheets of paper
to deliver the information), the mailing lists should be held to be
intangible.
Furthermore, the decision of whether to tax a transaction depends
on what occurred, and not on what might have occurred.

Commissioner v.

National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Mining Co., 417 U.S. 134, 148 (1974); Citizens
& Southern Systems, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 280 S.C. 138, 311
S.E.2d 717, 719 (1984).

The taxability decision is made on the basis of the

actual facts of the case.
296 Md. 459,

Comptroller of the Treasury v. Eguitable Trust Co.,

, 464 A.2d 248, 261 (1983).
A taxpayer must accept the consequences of its choice of medium.

Citizens & Southern Systems, Inc., 311 S.E.2d at 719; Chittenden Trust Co. v.
Kingt 143 Vt. 271,

, 465 A.2d 1100, 1102 (1983).

There is no rationale for

affording a taxpayer the benefit of a form of transaction it has not chosen.
Cowdrey, Software and Sales Taxes: The Illusory Intangible, 63 B.U.L. Rev.
181 (1983).

State laws that tax mediums such as books, films, and videotapes

and yet refuse to tax computer tapes unfairly favor software manufacturers
over the manufacturers of other products. Comment, Software Taxation: A
Critical Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859.
Computer software must possess physical properties such as mass
and volume to enable the host hardware unit to act in a predetermined manner,
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much like a paper roll in a player piano. Id^

Thus,) software programs can be

possessed, sold, created, or stolen.
Furthermore, the software industry has characterized itself as a
manufacturer of tangible products.

Id. at 868. Through amici curiae briefs

in patent cases, software manufacturers have urged tfie United States Supreme
Court to regard software as an apparatus or machine.

Parker v. Flook, 437

U.S. 584 (1978); Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (197k); Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63 (1972).

Trade publications also refer tb software as a product,

to its makers as manufacturers, and to its designers! as engineers.

1980

B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 869, (quoting D. McGlynn, Distributed Processing and Data
Communications at 258 (1978); M. Goetz, "The 'What is Software1 Legal Snafu",
at 3-4 (June 6, 1978) (unpublished paper presented sit the National Computer
Conference, Anaheim, California, by Martin A. Goetz^ Senior Vice-President of
Applied Data Research, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey)).

Industry experts do not

consider software to be intangible "information" residing within the hardware.
They see software as a machine component, similar to electronic circuitry.
1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 869, (quoting Goetz at 3; Myfers, What is Software?
Datamation, at 74 (Mar. 1979)).
An even stronger case can be made for treating the typed lists (as
compared to the lists on magnetic computer tapes) as tangible personal
property.

Clearly, the typed mailing lists can be classified as "corporeal

things capable of being possessed or exchanged."

The typed labels are

physical property used by the appellant by placing Ithem directly on the
circulars it mails. As mentioned earlier, the fact that the paper itself
would be of little value without the names and addresses on it is irrelevant
in determining the tangibility of the lists.
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Moreover, in Fingerhut Products, the case relied on by the
appellant, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because the physical
manifestations of the property (there the gummed labels) were used by
separating and attaching the labels to the envelopes, they could be taxed as
tangible personal property.

Fingerhut Products, 258 N.W.2d at 610.

Therefore, even if the computer tapes were found to be intangible, that
decision would not be dispositive of the tangibility of the typed mailing
lists.
All of the mailing lists the appellant rented from the Dependable
List Company and others were used as tangible personal property.

The value of

the data is entirely dependent upon the existence of the physical medium
containing the information.
F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).

Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 551
Both the magnetic tapes and the typed sheets of

paper are tangible items. Both are used to transfer information from one
place to another.
Endeavoring to separate the data from the medium or to distinguish
an issue of tangibility between the tapes and the paper would result in faulty
reasoning and inconsistent analysis.

"Consequently, there has been a recent

trend among state jurisdictions to characterize software, or its transference
onto a tangible storage form (such as a tape or floppy disk), as tangible and
therefore subject to sales and use taxes."
Intangible:

Barron and Bildzok, Fear of the

A Survey of the Accounting and Tax Issues Confronting the

Software Industry, 12 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 33, 79 (1986).
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POINT IV
THE LEGISLATURE COUCHED U.C.A. 59-16k3 IN GENERAL
TERMS, IN ORDER TO AFFORD THE TAX COMMISSION
GREAT LATITUDE IN ADMINISTERING THE STATUTE
Appellant cites Builders Components Supply Co. v. Cockayne, 22
Utah 2d 172, 450 P.2d 97 (1969) for the proposition that "statutes imposing
taxes and prescribing tax procedures should generally be construed favorably
to the taxpayer and strictly against the taxing authority."
at 99.

Builders 450 P.2d

However the same decision goes on to state in the next sentence: "Such

rules, though salutary in proper circumstances, should not be so applied as to
defeat or obstruct the correct operation and the application of taxing
procedures.

The payment of taxes is burdensome.

6ut the means of relief is

not to be found in allowing some taxpayers to slip by without paying their
fair share and thus putting on even greater burden on others.: jjd^ at 99.
Appellant argues that U.C.A. 59-16-3 i£ ambiguous and should be
construed in appellant's favor.

This argument ignores the fundamental nature

of the taxing statute at issue.

U.C.A. 59-16-3 is a broadly worded piece of

legislation.

It clearly endows the tax commission with great discretion.

Legislative reasoning behind the statute is quite pimple.

It implicitly

recognizes the impossibility of enumerating all it£ms embodied by the concept
of tangible personal property.
CONCLUSION
The mailing lists at issue are tangible personal property.

The

lists and not the services of the brokers were the primary focus of the
transactions.

While services were involved, they were incidental to the

acquisitions of the property interests in the tapes and labels. Thus, the
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transactions for the rentals of the lists were taxable.

Respondent

respectfully asks this Court to affirm the district court's decision.
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